Iraq War:The Unenviable Actions of Responsible Governments

By Con George-Kotzabasis

I cannot understand how you have deduced from my argument that I considered Saddam to be a “Muslim fanatic” or even alluded to him as being connected with 9/11. What I alluded to was “on the probable conception of the nexus of terrorism with rogue states” that no strategically astute and responsible government could disregard in the face of the atrocious action of 9/11 and more than probable the continuation of such actions in the near future, as exemplified in Madrid, Bali, and London. It was this “developing nexus of terrorism and rogue states,” as is presently illustrated by Iran and its terrorists proxies of Hamas and Hezbollah, that a politically responsible administration was duty-bound to prevent.


Certainly it is true that Saddam as a secularist leader might have been an enemy of “Islamic terrorists.” But you seem to be blind to the possibility that he could also consider them to be his allies against his comparative greater enemy, the United States. Saddam had the political insight to perceive fanatic terrorists developing into a weighty force, and by controlling them he could use them against his foes. That is why he gave generous payments to the families of Palestinian ‘martyrs’, trained terrorists in his own country, and provided medical treatment to the future leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, al Zarqawi.


Lastly, one can never possess “indisputable evidence” about the future actions of one’s enemy as such actions can never issue from scientific experiments. One can only surmise such evidence from the malicious past actions of one’s foe and his intention to use ruthlessly all means to defeat his enemies, as Saddam did in the war against Iran and against the Kurds by using mustard gas. When one’s life is at stake, one does not search for imponderable evidence before one acts in self-defence. It is by such clear threats that the unenviable pre-emptive military actions of responsible governments are made.

How to Overcome Difficulties of a No-Fly Zone and How to Defeat Gaddafi

By Con George-Kotzabasis March 05, 2011

The ineffectiveness of a no-fly zone in Bosnia cannot be used as an argument in the totally different circumstances in Libya. Milocevic was fighting a nationalist war for a greater Serbia and his relatively powerful military forces were involved ardently in this 'great' goal of Serbia. By contrast, Gaddafi is fighting for his own survival with a weakened army, due to defections from its ranks, and compelled to import mercenaries to kill his own people, which in turn increases and exacerbates the divide between the regime and the Libyan people. This is the fundamental difference between Milocevic and Gaddafi. Therefore, I would propose the following strategy.

The design of a strategy of the unexpected by U.S. military strategists might overcome the difficulties of a no-fly zone, as expounded by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and might defeat Muammar Gadhafi.

Given the destabilization of his regime, not only because of the revolt of the Libyan people but also because of the widespread defection of politicians, diplomats, and military personnel to the side of the rebels, this chain of events has increased the magnitude of the vulnerability of his own supporters to the call of major nations and of the UN for the ousting of Gadhafi, and hence could ease, and lead to, the abandonment of the autocrat.

To ratchet up the momentum of this vulnerability, military strategists should draw up a plan of vaguely defined unexpected threats that would be inflicted on Gadhafi’s supporters if they continued to defend him. The linchpin of this plan would have two strategic components. The immediate declaration by the U.S. and NATO of both the imposition of a no-fly zone and of no-use of air defences by Libyan forces. In the event that the latter do not abide to these two demands they would draw like fly-stick upon themselves the awesome devastation that will emerge from the military power of the U.S. and NATO. The latter will not have to send one aircraft over, or ground one soldier in, Libya, they will only have to ‘send’ this uncertainty as to the unexpected destruction that would befall on the supporters of Gadhafi.

Airpower therefore can also be used as a psychological weapon, especially in circumstances when the enemy’s military forces are losing trust toward their political leadership and are concerned about their own safety, as presently happens to be the situation in Libya.

Veni vidi vici.